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I. Introduction
Today, only the foolhardy would purchase a commercial
or industrial piece of property without performing some de-
gree of an environmental due diligence. Such an acquisition
may result in exposure to environmentally-related liabilities
that can easily dwarf the value of the acquired real estate.
These liabilities could result from at least two kinds of legal
attacks: by neighbors who bring toxic tort actions, typically
under state common law, and by government agencies or
others who sue under the federal Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 1 or its
1. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), as
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75 (West 1993-94)). In President Clinton's State of the Union Address
to the joint session of Congress on February 17, 1993, the President noted his
concern with CERCLA. Steven A. Herman, A Fundamentally Different
Superfund Program, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 196 (Winter 1998). President
Clinton stated: 'Some things work and some things don't. We ought to be subsi-
dizing the things that work and discouraging the things that don't. I'd like to
use that Superfund to clean up pollution for a change and not just pay lawyers."
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state equivalents. 2
As the owner, and possibly operator, of the contaminated
property, 3 the purchaser could be held liable pursuant to
CERCLA. Popularly known as the Superfund Act,4 CERCLA
was enacted by Congress to provide the nation with a compre-
Id. quoting President Clinton. By early 1997 there had been three Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) reforms, but not a legislative reform. See id. for a
discussion of EPA's reform efforts. There have been numerous legislative re-
form attempts as evidenced by the various Bills introduced before the United
States' House and Senate in the 1 0 4 th, 105' , and 106' Congressional Sessions.
See <http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi-bincpquery>. These Bills have proposed the vari-
ous amendments to CERCLA including revisions to the statute's innocent land-
owner defense provision. See infra note 85. Where appropriate, this Article
will make reference to Senate Bill S. 20, the Brownfields and Environmental
Cleanup Act of 1999 which is the most recent Bill introduced at the time this
Article was submitted for print. Since it cannot be predicted whether Senate
Bill S. 20 or some other Bill amending the innocent landowner provision will be
approved by Congress, the analysis contained within this Article is based on
CERCLA as amended by SARA.
2. See Michael B. Gerrard & Deborah Goldberg, Interaction of Toxic Tort
and CERCLA Litigation, N.Y. L.J., July 26, 1996, at 3. For example, Title 13 of
the Environmental Conservation Law represents New York State's equivalent
to CERCLA. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw §§ 27-1301 to 1321 (McKinney 1984).
The response fund created by Title 13 for cleaning up inactive hazardous waste
disposal sites does not reimburse those costs covered by CERCLA. See Wein-
berg, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw following § 27-1301.
Title 13 also explicitly states that response actions taken pursuant to it "shall
[not] duplicate federal actions for funding removal costs, damages or claims
with respect to the release of hazardous substances within the state" and that
"no payments to the hazardous waste remedial fund... shall be used for com-
pensation of claims, costs of response or damage which may be funded under
federal law." 1982 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw ch. 857, at 19. Thus, it would
appear that CERCLA does not preempt New York's equivalent state law.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1993-94). The term "property" is encompassed
within CERCLA's broad definition of facility which means any building, struc-
ture, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline, well, pit, pond lagoon, impound-
ment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft,
or any site where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed
of, placed, or otherwise come to be located. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(9)(A), (B)
(1993-94).
4. Taxes levied on major petroleum and chemical facilities as well as gen-
eral funding create a "Superfund." See 26 U.S.C. §§ 59A, 4611-12 (1993-94).
The Superfund is used to finance the clean-up of hazardous waste sites if no
responsible parties can be identified by the government or the responsible par-
ties do not agree to pay at which time the government will finance the clean-up
and subsequently sue the responsible parties to recover the clean-up costs. See
U.S.C. § 9611 (West 1993-94).
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hensive mechanism for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites,
hazardous spills and the release of hazardous substances into
the environment. 5 One of the primary purposes of the
Superfund Act is to facilitate government cleanup of hazard-
ous waste discharge and impede future releases in order to
prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health,
welfare, or to the environment, which may otherwise result
from a release or threat of a release. 6 CERCLA imposes strict
liability on the current owner of a facility from which there is
a release or threat of release, without regard to causation.7
While neighbors can bring an action against the property
owner under CERCLA, Superfund money may not be used to
compensate personal or property injury caused by hazardous
substances.8 Thus, if neighbors suffer personal injury or
property damage as a result of hazardous substances depos-
ited at the subject property, they must resort to the common
law tort theories of trespass, negligence, nuisance, or strict
liability for recovery. In many cases, the plaintiff-neighbor
will seek to apply multiple theories of common law liability. 9
Should the plaintiff-neighbor assert both CERCLA and com-
mon law claims against the defendant property-owner, the
plaintiff "will typically bring a CERCLA claim in federal
court and then seek pendent jurisdiction over the state
claims."10 Most courts have granted such pendent jurisdic-
5. See also Prudential Insurance Company v. U.S. Gypsum, 711 F. Supp.
1244, 1251 (D.N.J. 1989).
6. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 360 (1986). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(23).
7. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).
8. See Exxon Corp., 475 U.S. at 359. A private party is restricted to seek-
ing reimbursement from the Superfund for response costs incurred as a result
of carrying out the federal government's national contingency plan (NCP) pro-
vided, however, the costs are expressly authorized by the federal government.
See id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2).
9. See Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 852 (M.D. Pa.
1988) (plaintiffs alleging that defendant contaminated their well water brought
suit under the theories of negligence, trespass, nuisance and strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities).
10. See Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 2, at 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1357
(1994)).
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tion," although a few have refused it where state law issues
predominate.12
Toxic tort actions and CERCLA actions interact in com-
plex ways, creating both opportunities and perils for defend-
ants.' 3 Issues of potential benefit or concern to the defendant
include: health risk studies performed by the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR),14 confiden-
tially issues, compliance issues, and attorney-client privilege
issues.' 5 The purchaser of a contaminated piece of property
can find these issues intertwined in his defense of both CER-
CLA and multiple toxic tort claims, in a single lawsuit or
multiple lawsuits, with a single claimant or multiple
claimants.
In defense of a CERCLA claim, the purchaser of a con-
taminated piece of property may find relief by asserting the
statutory "innocent landowner" defense. 16 If successful, the
defendant would then be able to focus on the toxic tort claims
arising from the same cause of action. Since, however, CER-
CLA has grown out of general tort ideas, such as products
liability and liability for ultrahazardous activities, 17 and
CERCLA has been criticized for being duplicative of state
toxic tort law provisions,' 8 why shouldn't the successful as-
sertion of the innocent landowner defense for the CERCLA
claim bar the defendant from being subject to toxic tort
claims arising from a common nucleus of operative facts?
11. See id. (citing Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp.,
737 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 964 F.2d (2d Cir. 1992)); Piccolini v.
Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063 (M.D. Pa. 1988)).
12. See Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 2, at 3 (citing Lykins v. Westing-
house Elec., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3609, at *1 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Dublin Scarboro Im-
provement Assoc. v. Hartford County, 678 F. Supp. 129 (D. Md. 1988)).
13. See Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 2, at 3.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1992-93).
15. See Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 2, for a more thorough discussion of
these issues.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
17. See Jill D. Neiman, Easement Holder Liability Under CERCLA: The
Right Way to Deal with Rights-of-Way, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1233, 1240 (1991) (cit-
ing S. REP. No. 96-848, at 14 (1980), reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATWVE
HIsToRY, at 186 (1982)).
18. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 67 (1980), reprinted in 1
SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATWVE HIsToRY, at 232).
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Part II of this Article develops the relationship between
common law tort theories and CERCLA. The foundation of
the innocent landowner defense is laid in Part III by discuss-
ing the defense's origin and purpose. Part IV of the Article
examines a representative number of cases in which the pur-
chasers of contaminated property have attempted to assert
the innocent landowner defense. The cases represent court
holdings which have broadly construed the statutory provi-
sions in order to establish an evidentiary threshold that has
developed via case law.
The elements of the various common law tort theories,
which a plaintiff must prove, are then contrasted in Part V
with the evidentiary threshold required for the successful as-
sertion of the innocent landowner defense. As a result of this
analysis, the issue of whether the innocent landowner de-
fense should defeat toxic tort claims on a summary judgment
motion made by the property owner is answered. Part VI
concludes the Article by speculating why there are no pub-
lished cases in which the owner of a contaminated piece of
property has asserted the underlying premise of the innocent
landowner defense as a defense in a related toxic tort claim.
II. The Toxic Tort-CERCLA Relationship
Common law tort principles have generally imposed lia-
bility upon property owners responsible for environmental
pollution that caused injury to persons or neighboring prop-
erty.19 Similarly, during the Ninety-sixth Congress, a "toxic
waste bill" was introduced which contained provisions for the
private recovery for injury to property, economic loss, and
personal injury caused by environmental pollution. 20 The bill
sparked a heated debate in both Houses of Congress about
the need for establishing a "toxic tort" or a federal cause of
19. See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation and Responsibility, 78
MiNN. L. REV. 1493, 1503 (1994).
20. See H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a), 126 CONG. REC. 7490 (1980).
The bill was introduced by Representative Florio on Apr. 2, 1980. The first haz-
ardous waste bill which passed in the House of Representatives on September
19, 1980 provided for the recovery of, among other items, injury to property but
not for personal injury. H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(b) (1980).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/1
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action for personal injury and property damages resulting
from the release of hazardous substances to the
environment. 21
Under the common law of torts, the plaintiff must
demonstrate the defendant's activity was a direct cause of the
resulting personal injury or damage to property regardless of
the theory of liability under which the tort claim is brought. 22
During the Ninety-sixth Congress, while the House of Repre-
sentatives proposed that those who "caused or contributed" to
environmental contamination be held liable, the Senate de-
sired that CERCLA impose liability on the "responsible par-
ties."23 The repercussion of the Senate's triumph was that
the traditional tort concept of causation remained for the
courts to discern. 24
CERCLA, enacted in December 1980, allows for neither
the private recovery of injury to persons or property nor does
it explicitly delineate the element of causation. Had the
sponsors of CERCLA not restricted the Act's purview in order
to enact it before the Reagan Administration entered office in
1981, it is conceivable that CERCLA may have contained the
tort principles of causation and private party recovery. 25 As
evidenced by the legislative history, CERCLA is unquestiona-
bly modeled after common law tort liability rules which seek
to influence the behavior of landowners and other relevant
actors. 26
The reauthorization of CERCLA27 saw a renewed at-
tempt to integrate common law torts into the federal statute.
An amendment would have granted those personally injured
by the release of hazardous substances a right to sue in fed-
21. See Frederic M. Mauhs, Judicial Limitations on the CERCLA Private
Right of Action, 15 ENvTL. L. 471, 476 (1985).
22. See GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AND Toxic TORT 7 (1994).
23. See Nagle, supra note 19, at 1493-94.
24. See id.
25. See Mauhs, supra note 21, at 475 (citing H. NEEDHAM & M. MENEFEE,
SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1-3 ENVTL. L. INST. (1983)).
26. See generally Nagle, supra note 19, at 1503.
27. See supra note 1.
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eral court under Superfund. 28 Opponents argued that com-
mon law tort remedies were adequate and that the federal
courts would become inundated with personal injury
claims. 29 In passing SARA, 3° however, Congress inextricably
linked toxic tort law with CERCLA by creating the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR).31 Congress
designed ATSDR to provide the public with toxicological in-
formation and risk potentials to help plaintiffs meet their
burden of proof in lawsuits. 32
III. Statutory Provisions of the Innocent Landowner
Defense
The enumerated defenses in CERCLA33 do not explicitly
provide a defense for the innocent landowner.34 Congress'
work product is consistent with "the definition of a strict lia-
bility standard [in] that innocence is not a defense."35 In
CERCLA's early years, many property purchasers who were
28. The amendment was submitted by Representative Barney Frank. H.R.
3852, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. Hl, 574 (1985).
29. See id. at Hll, 575-85.
30. See supra note 1.
31. See supra note 14, CERCLA authorized the establishment of the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) which reports directly to
the Surgeon General of the United States. In part, the ATSDR maintains in-
ventories of literature, research and studies of the health effects of toxic sub-
stances and hazardous substances most commonly found at Superfund sites. 42
U.S.C. § 9604(i).
32. See Rory A. Valas, Comments: Toxic Palsgraf Proving Causation When
the Link Between Conduct and Injury Appears Extraordinary, 18 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 773, 777 (citing H.R. REP. No. 253(I), at 84-90 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2866-72).
33. There shall be no liability for a person otherwise liable who can
establish beyond a preponderance of the evidence that the release
or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages re-
sulting therefrom were caused solely by: (1) an act of God; (2) an act
of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party other than an em-
ployee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing di-
rectly or indirectly, with the defendant.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
34. See Aaron Gershonowitz & Miguel Padilla, Superfund's Innocent Land-
owner Defense: Elusive or Illusory? 6 Toxics LAw REP. (BNA) 626 (Oct. 16,
1991).
35. Id.
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not responsible for causing the release of hazardous sub-
stances could not establish the innocent landowner defense
because the purchase and sale agreement by which they ac-
quired the property gave them a contractual relationship
with someone who played a role in the release of hazardous
substances. 36
The innocent landowner defense was created in 1986, 37
when Congress decided to define "contractual relationship" to
exclude land contracts, deeds, or other instruments transfer-
ring title of the real property, for the purpose of CERCLA's
third-party defense. 38 By statute, a defendant could only
avail himself of the innocent landowner defense if:
1. The property was acquired by the defendant after the
disposal or placement of the hazardous substances on,
in, or at the property;39
2. At the time the defendant acquired the property, the
defendant did not know and had no reason to know
that any hazardous substances, which was the subject
of the release or threatened release, was disposed of
on, in, or at the property;40 and
3. The defendant can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the release, or threat of release of a haz-
ardous substance, and the damages resulting
therefrom,
(i) were caused solely by the act or omission of a third
party who was not in a contractual relationship
with the defendant; 41 and
(ii) they exercised due care with respect to the hazard-
ous substances 42 and took precautions against
36. See Aaron Gershonowitz, When is a Superfund Property Owner Innocent
Enough to Establish the Innocent Landowner Defense? Toxics L. REP., July 17,
1996, at 215. See also 131 CONG. REC. 34,714-24 (1985) (House members were
troubled by the fact that CERCLA's strict liability was inequitable to innocent
purchasers of contaminated property.).
37. See supra note 1.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)(a).
9
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foreseeable acts or omissions of any third party43
and the consequences that could foreseeably result
from such acts or omissions. 44
In order to establish the lack of knowledge, with regard
to the presence of hazardous substances on, in, or at the prop-
erty required by the second statutory provision, the defend-
ant must undertake at the time of acquisition an "all
appropriate inquiry" into the previous ownership and uses of
the property consistent with good commercial or customary
practice in an effort to minimize liability.45 CERCLA does
not define an "all appropriate inquiry,"46 however, Congress
has provided the courts with a non-inclusive list of factors to
consider when determining whether a prospective purchaser/
property owner made an "all appropriate inquiry."47 As such,
the successful assertion of the innocent landowner defense
compels the proof of lofty requirements that are subject to the
discretionary powers of the court due to the vagueness of the
statutory language.
IV. Application of the Innocent Landowner Defense
While the innocent landowner defense "would appear to
be an oasis"48 for the truly "innocent" purchaser of contami-
43. The third party cannot be an employee or agent of the defendant. See
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)(b).
44. Id.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B).
46. In Senate Bill S. 20, The Brownfields and Environmental Cleanup Act
of 1999 provides a standard for an "all appropriate inquiry." See infra note 85,
and accompanying text.
47. In determining whether a prospective purchaser/property owner made
"all appropriate inquiry," the court shall take into account
any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the [prospec-
tive purchaser/property owner], the relationship of the purchase
price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly
known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property,
the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination
at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by ap-
propriate inspection.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B).
48. L. Jager Smith, Jr., Note, CERCLA's Innocent Landowner Defense: Oa-
sis or Mirage? 18 COLUM. J. ErL. L. 155, 157 (1993).
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nated property, "it frequently turns out to be a mirage for
those who seek to assert it." 49 Case law has rebuffed the suc-
cessful assertion of the innocent landowner defense for non-
compliance with each of the statutory provisions.
This section briefly examines the provisions of the inno-
cent landowner defense in the context of case law. The objec-
tive is to demonstrate what actions, or lack thereof, will cause
a property owner to lose the ability to assert the statutory
defense. By selecting cases that have broadly interpreted the
statutory provisions, the discussion attempts to define the ev-
identiary threshold courts have set forth for each statutory
defense.
A. Defendant Must Acquire Property After the Disposal of
Hazardous Substances
The plain language of the statute indicates that a defend-
ant, who is truly "innocent" of harmful disposal activities,
could demonstrate that they acquired the property after dis-
covery of hazardous substances on their property. More often
than not the extremely broad definition of "disposal,"50 or the
theory of disposal accepted by courts, precludes such a result.
CERCLA borrows the definition of "disposal" from the
Solid Waste Disposal Act.51 Due to the breadth of the defini-
tion, the purchaser of property who commences operation
upon acquiring title can be guilty of disposing hazardous sub-
stances if his operation does not implement good manufactur-
ing practices. A leaking pump seal, for example, or the
49. Id.
50. The term 'disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping,
spilling, leaking, or placing of any [hazardous substances] into or on any land or
water so that such [hazardous substances] or any constituent thereof may enter
the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, in-
cluding groundwaters. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1993-94).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29). In part, the purpose of the Solid Waste Dispo-
sal Act (SWDA), as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) of 1976, is to assure that hazardous waste management practices are
conducted in a manner which protects human health and the environment
thereby reducing the need for corrective action, via CERCLA or state statute.
42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4), (5) (1993-94).
11
254 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
careless loading/unloading of hazardous substances, can de-
feat the innocent landowner defense for the purchaser.
The scope of the term "disposal" as employed in CERCLA
matters is unsettled in the courts. The contrasting theories
embraced by the courts are a "passive theory" of disposal 52
which is generally premised on the migration of contamina-
tion during one's ownership, and the opposite viewpoint that
"disposal" requires active disposal of hazardous substances. 53
A number of courts use the policy argument that a passive
migration defense would allow a property owner to avoid lia-
bility by failing to take corrective action on environmental
contamination that exists on his property. 54 The counter ar-
gument used by a seemingly equal number of courts is that
the use of the "passive" theory to define "disposal" in CER-
CLA matters controverts the plain language of CERCLA. 55
The struggle of the courts with regard to how to best de-
fine "disposal" in CERCLA matters can be illustrated by
52. See, e.g., CPC Int'l Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269,
1278 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (the unchecked migration of contaminated groundwater
constitutes disposal under CERCLA); Stanley Works v. Syndergeneral Corp.,
781 F. Supp. 659, 662-64 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (ongoing migration of hazardous sub-
stances constitutes disposal under CERCLA); State of New York v. Almy Broth-
ers, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 668, 676-77 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (CERCLA disposal includes
the gradual leaking from drums buried prior to the purchaser's ownershi);
Nurad, Inc v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 844-46 ( 4 th Cir.
1992) ("Passive" is enough for CERCLA liability); United States v. Waste In-
dus;, Inc;, 734 F.2d 159, 164 (4 th Cir 1984) (disposal includes "passive"disposal
under RCRA); United States v. Price, 253 F. Supp 1055, 1071 (D.N.J. 1981),
afId, 688 F. 2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) ( standing for the proposition that the term
"disposal" in CERCLA may include passive insertion since RCRA's definition of
"disposal" encompasses "leaking" which does not normally through an affirma-
tive action, but rather as a result of inaction).
53. See United States v. Peterson Sand and Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346
(N.D. IL. 1992).
54. See Nurad, Inc., v. William E. Hopper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th
Cir. 1992).
55. See United States v. Peterson Sand and Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346,
1352 (N.D.I1. 1992) reaching an "inescapable conclusion" that a passive mean-
ing of "disposal" controverts the plain language of CERCLA); Ecodyne Corp. v.
Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1455-57 (rejecting "passive" disposal in the grammati-
cal construction of CERCLA); Snediker Developers Ltd. Partnership v. Evans,
773 F. Supp. 984, 988-89 (E.D. Mich. 1991) ("the mere migration of hazardous
waste, without more, does not constitute disposal within the meaning of
§ 6903(3)."
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/1
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United States v. CDMG Realty Co.56 In CDMG Realty, a pur-
chaser acquired an undeveloped tract of land that was once
part of a larger tract of land that was a landfill suspected of
containing hazardous substances. 57 During the purchaser's
ownership, the tract of land remained vacant and was not ac-
tively used in any manner.58 Approximately six years later,
the original purchaser sold the tract of land to a subsequent
buyer who was eventually named as a defendant in a CER-
CLA lawsuit commenced by the federal and state authori-
ties.5 9 The subsequent buyer then filed a third party suit
against the original purchaser seeking contribution for poten-
tial liability under CERCLA. 60 On cross motions for sum-
mary judgment, the United States District Court of New
Jersey held that "there must be some element of active
human participation before owner liability for disposal can
attach under CERCLA." 61 On appeal, the Third Circuit
stated that the passive migration of contamination from haz-
ardous substances that were dumped in the landfill prior to
the purchaser's ownership does not constitute disposal under
CERCLA as the neither the terms "leaking" or "spilling"
within the definition of "disposal" denotes the gradual
spreading of contamination. 62 This conclusion was based on
the Third Circuit's examination of the text of CERCLA, which
the court found to be supported by the structure of the statute
as well as being consistent with CERCLA's intended pur-
pose.63 The court, however, was very careful in stating that
this holding was not to be broadly construed or did not pre-
clude the use of the "passive theory" of disposal. According to
the Court, "the language of CERCLA's 'disposal' definition
56. 875 F. Supp. 1077 (D.N.J.) vacated and remanded 96 F. 3d 706 (1996)
(on the grounds that the subsequent buyer may proceed on its "active" theory of
disposal).
57. 875 F. Supp. 1077, 1079-80.
58. Id. at 1080.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1077. The original purchaser's motion for summary judgment was
granted by the District Court.
62. 96 F. 3d 706, 718.
63. Id. at 711.
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cannot encompass the spreading of waste at issue here [,]"64
but [we] find [ ] it unnecessary to [address the issue] whether
the movement of contaminants unaided by human conduct
can ever constitute 'disposal,"' in a CERCLA matter.65 Thus,
while on the surface one may think he is acquiring property
after the disposal of hazardous substances, he can never be
assured of the fact due to the potential of passive migration of
contaminants and the murkiness of the courts' opinions on
this issue.
B. The Requirement of No Causation, Due Care and
Foreseeability on the Part of the Purchaser
In order to assert the innocent landowner defense, CER-
CLA requires that defendant establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the release of hazardous substances, and
the resulting damages, were caused solely by the act or omis-
sion of a third party.66 Limited guidance, as to the interpre-
tation of the sole cause requirement, is provided in the
legislative history or the CERCLA statute.67 Case law, how-
ever, illustrates that the term "solely" has been interpreted
by courts quite strictly so that any involvement, no matter
how insignificant, can destroy the defense. 68
In Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, 69 the court would
not allow USGI, a third-party defendant, from asserting that
the contamination at a landfill was caused solely by ASARCO
even though their relatively small contribution of waste may
not have caused the release of the hazardous substances that
prompted the lawsuit.70 USGI produced an insulation prod-
64. Id.
65. Id. See Michael S. Caplan, Escaping CERCLA Liability: The Interim
Owner Passive Migration Defense Gains Circuit Recognition, 28 ENVrL. L. REP.
10121, 10121 (1998) (advocating the position that the "disposal" of hazardous
substances requires an active process to invoke CERCLA liability).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
67. See Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgens, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1539 (E.D.
Cal. 1992).
68. See Gershonowitz, supra note 34, at 215.
69. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, 735 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Wash.
1990).
70. See id. at 362.
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uct called "shot" during the manufacturing process of wool.7 1
"Shot" was used to build a road into a landfill which required
clean-up due to the release of hazardous substances by other
companies, principally Louisiana-Pacific Corporation and
ASARCO.72 USGI only discarded 1.5% of the waste sent to
the landfill, some of which became mixed with other materi-
als deposited at the landfill.7 3 Laboratory analyses on sev-
eral samples of shot indicated that the shot contained
"extremely small concentrations of hazardous [substances]
... which may be below the levels government agencies con-
sider to be hazardous."74 Nevertheless, the court held that
since the small volume of USGI's shot may have threatened a
release at the landfill, "even minimally," USGI could not as-
sert the defense that the damages were caused solely by a
third party.75
Moreover, negligent acts as well as a failure to act con-
tribute to the release of hazardous substances. For example,
prior to acquiring the property, the purchaser performs "all
appropriate inquiry"76 which may include a soil investigation
to determine whether the property is contaminated. If the
soil investigation is conducted negligently and, as a result,
causes the spread of contaminants, the prospective purchaser
may not be able to claim that the release of hazardous sub-
stances was caused solely by third parties in a subsequent
CERCLA action.77 Moreover, the soil investigation may not
identify the presence of subsurface contamination, but con-
tamination may be discovered years later by other means. 78
In this instance, if the owner does not act by taking a proper
response and remedial action, the purchaser can be consid-
71. See id. at 360.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 362.
75. 735 F. Supp. 358, 363 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
76. See discussion infra part C.
77. See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996).
78. Contamination resulting from historical activities can be discovered
years later whether or not the property owner took an affirmative action. For
example, contamination can be discovered via development of the property in
whole or in part, including the sudden presence of contamination in well water,
etc.
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ered to have contributed to the release of hazardous
substances. 7 9
The lack of good manufacturing practices by existing ten-
ants have been imputed to the purchaser as not exercising
due care. In Washington v. Time Oil Co.,80 the court found
Time Oil Co. (Time Oil) liable for not exercising due care or
taking precautions with respect to the hazardous substances
that had been released to the environment by Time Oil's sub-
lessee.81 The court said that it was "clear [that] Time Oil al-
lowed [the sublessee] to run a sloppy operation."8 2 A similar
result can be found where the purchaser acquires title of the
property and continues his predecessor's operation which
does not adhere to good manufacturing practices. The stan-
dard for due care has been explained by one court as the duty
by a property owner to investigate and if an area of environ-
mental concern is identified, "due care would.., require that
[the property owner] take some steps to ascertain the nature
of any environmental threats associated with [the release]."83
Closely related to the obligation of the purchaser to exer-
cise due care with regard to hazardous substances after they
are discovered is the requirement of foreseeability. In New
York v. Shore Realty,8 4 the defendant purchased land for de-
velopment purposes and, upon closing, evicted the existing
tenants.8 8 The court held that Shore Realty was aware of the
nature of the tenants' activities before closing on the title
and, hence, the releases and threats of release from these ac-
tivities were neither "caused solely" by the tenants nor did
79. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472, 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that since it took Shapiro almost five years to adequately re-
spond after discovering contamination, the delay contributed to the release of
hazardous substances and, thus, the release was not caused solely by third
parties).
80. 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
81. See id. at 533.
82. Id.
83. United States v. A & N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc., 854 F. Supp.
229, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (where the property owner had reason to suspect
his tenant was contaminating his property but failed to ask his tenant about his
operations).
84. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
85. See id. at 1048.
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Shore Realty take "precautions against" these "foreseeable
acts or omissions."8 6
In sum, the statutory requirements of no causation, due
care and foreseeability appear to place a burden on the prop-
erty owner to affirmatively act upon the identification of a po-
tential release of hazardous substances to the environment.
"The requirement that the contamination be 'solely' the re-
sult of a third party most often dooms efforts to evoke this
defense because of the defendant's possibly tangential in-
volvement at the site."8 7 In addition, an otherwise innocent
landowner who identifies contamination on his property
caused by others and does not react in a timely or appropriate
manner, or who does not foresee the resultant consequences
will lose his ability to assert the affirmative defense of being
an innocent landowner. The reach of the "foreseeability" im-
posed on the property owner for the actions of third parties
after the acquisition of the property is unclear, but it may
well be as broad as the property owner's duty to inquire.88
C. Lack of Knowledge Required Upon Acquisition of the
Property
The innocent landowner defense requires that, at the
time of acquisition, the purchaser of property did not know,
and had no reason to know, that any hazardous substances,
which was the subject of the release or threatened release,
was disposed of on, in, or at the property.8 9 In order to satisfy
the lack of knowledge element, the defendant must under-
take, at the time of acquisition, an "all appropriate inquiry"
into the previous ownership and uses of the property consis-
86. See id. at 1049. But see New York v. Lashins Arcade Co., 856 F. Supp.
153, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the release of hazardous substances was
caused solely by the tenants (who operated the dry cleaners in the strip mall
that Lashins purchased and who had disposed of the hazardous substances fif-
teen years before Lashins purchased the property) and that Lashins had done
everything it could have reasonably done to avoid or correct the problem).
87. Nagle, supra note 19, at 1538.
88. See James M. Strock, The Genesis of the 'Innocent Landowner' Defense,
10 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 592, 592 (Oct. 5, 1988).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i).
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tent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort
to minimize liability.90
The requisite standard of inquiry is not defined by CER-
CLA, and the legislative history indicates that one does not
exist.91 What the legislative history reveals is "a shifting
standard where more sophisticated purchasers will be held to
a higher standard and the standard will change over time so
that all defendants will be held to a higher standard as public
awareness of environmental concerns grows." 92 Federal leg-
islators 93 as well as professional organizations have at-
tempted to define the requisite standard of inquiry.
After several draft versions and a prolonged comment pe-
riod, the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). For the purposes of this statutory provi-
sion, the court shall take into account any specialized knowledge or experience
on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value
of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertain-
able information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely
presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such con-
tamination by appropriate inspection. See id.
91. Pursuant to the House Conference Report, public awareness at the time
of acquisition of the property will determine the requisite standard of inquiry.
H.R. REP. No. 962 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3280.
92. Gershonowitz, supra note 36, at 215 (citing 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276,
3280).
93. In introducing H.R. 570, 103d Cong. (1993), Representative Curt Wel-
don (R-PA) stated that "Congress ... should, at a minimum, define the scope of
the required [appropriate inquiry] investigation." 139 CONG. REC. H218 (Jan.
25, 1993) (statement of Rep. Weldon). Section 301, Innocent Landowners of the
Brownfields and Environmental Cleanup Act of 1999, Senate Bill S. 20, pro-
poses to provide such a standard of inquiry. Senate Bill S. 20 would amend
CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) by inserting a "Knowledge of Inquiry Require-
ment." According to the proposed legislation, a person who has acquired real
property shall be considered to have made an "all appropriate inquiry" if, within
180 days prior to the date of acquisition, an environmental site assessment of
the real property was conducted. S. 20, 1 0 6 th Cong. (1999). The proposed legisla-
tion requires an environmental site assessment to be conducted in accordance
with the standards set forth in the American Society for Testing Materials
(ASTM) Standard E1527-94, titled "Standard Practice for Environmental Site
Assessments: Phase I Environmental Site Assessment Process" or with any al-
ternative standards issued by regulation by the President or issued or devel-
oped by other entities and designated by regulation by the President. See id.
The proposed Bill would also provide a definition for contamination to mean "an
existing release, past release, or the threat of a release of a hazardous sub-
stance." Id.
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published a comprehensive blueprint9 4 for conducting envi-
ronmental site assessments.9 5 The objective of ASTM's publi-
cation, as explicitly stated in its purpose, is to define good
commercial and customary practice in order to allow the user
of the standard to satisfy the "all appropriate inquiry" re-
quirement of CERCLA § 101(35)(B). 96 Although widely rec-
ognized in industry and required by most lending
institutions, there are no published cases that address
whether adherence to ASTM's standards satisfy the requisite
knowledge element of the statutory defense. 97
Until such time Congress amends CERCLA to provide an
"all appropriate inquiry" standard, a potential purchaser
should refer to New Jersey's version of CERCLA, which sup-
plies an "all appropriate inquiry" standard, 98 for guidance.
94. STANDARD PRACTICE FOR ENvTL. SITE ASSESSMENTS: PHASE I ENvTL.
SITE ASSESSMENT PROCESS, E 1527-94 (1994). This standard has been written
into, by reference, the proposed Senate Bill S. 20, The Brownfields and Environ-
mental Cleanup Act of 1999. See supra note 85.
95. Many terms are utilized to denote the activities that are undertaken by
a potential purchaser who is attempting to satisfy the "all appropriate inquiry"
language of CERCLA's innocent landowner defense. Two of the more commonly
used phrases are "environmental due diligence" and "environmental site assess-
ment" (ESA). Both phrases can be used interchangeably, however, the perform-
ance of environmental due diligence will typically include the performance of an
ESA. A review of historical records and data as well as interviewing potentially
informative persons will typically be done during an environmental due dili-
gence and an ESA. The phrase "ESA" indicates that a physical visit to the sub-
ject property was performed in an attempt to identify potential areas of
environmental concern. ESAS are performed in phases. A Phase I ESA in-
cludes record review, conducting interviews and a visual observation of the sub-
ject property and surrounding properties. A Phase II ESA involves limited
sampling in order to confirm or refute the Phase I ESA observations as to
whether the potential areas of environmental concern warrant further investi-
gation. A Phase III ESA, or a remedial investigation, involves more extensive
sampling by intrusive methods such as the installation of sampling wells and
subsurface soil investigations via drill rigs.
96. See supra note 82, and accompanying text.
97. This will surely change if Senate Bill S. 20 is passed, as currently writ-
ten, designating ASTM standard E1527-94, "Standard Practice for Environ-
mental Site ASsessments: Phase I Environmental Site Assessment Process" as
the standard to determine whether a prospective purchaser made an "all appro-
priate inquiry" prior to closing on the real property transaction. See supra note
85.
98. New Jersey's version of CERCLA is the Spill Compensation and Control
Act (Spill Act) enacted in 1977 and is considered to be the legislation on which
19
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To establish the lack of knowledge regarding the discharge of
hazardous substances, the potential purchaser "must have
undertaken, at the time of acquisition, an 'all appropriate in-
quiry' into the previous ownership and uses of the prop-
erty."99 "The Spill Act defines an 'all appropriate inquiry' as
the performance of a preliminary assessment, 100 and site in-
vestigation' 01 (if the preliminary assessment indicates that a
CERCLA was modeled. However, the New Jersey legislatures did not incorpo-
rate an innocent landowner defense into the Spill Act until 1993. N.J.L. 1993,
c. 139 Sect. 44. The Spill Act's lack of knowledge clause within its innocent
landowner defense provision is substantially the same as that of CERCLA's
lack of knowledge clause. Compare " . . . at the time the person acquired the
real property, the person did not know and had no reason to know that any
hazardous substance had been discharged at the real property .... " N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 58:10-23.11(g)(d)(2)(b)(i) (1998) with " . . . at the time the defendant
acquired the property, the defendant did not know and had no reason to know
that any hazardous substances, which was the subject of the release or
threatened release, was disposed of on, in, or at the property .... ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35)(A)(i). The second portion of the Spill Act's lack of knowledge clause
provides a conditional defense for persons acquiring real property by devise or
succession. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(g)(d)(2)(b)(ii) (1998).
99. Spill Act, N.J.L. 1993, c. 139 Sect. 44.
100. New Jersey's Brownfields and Contamination Site Remediation Act de-
fines a "preliminary assessment" to mean
the first phase in the process of identifying areas of concern and
determining whether hazardous substances or hazardous wastes
are or were present at an industrial establishment or have mi-
grated or are migrating from the industrial establishment, and
shall include the initial search for and evaluation of, existing site
specific operational and environmental information, both current
and historic, to determine if further investigation concerning the
documented, alleged, suspected or latent discharge of any hazard-
ous substance or hazardous waste is required.
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 58:10B-1. The evaluation of historic information shall be con-
ducted from 1932 to the present, except that the [New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection] may require the search for, and evaluation of, addi-
tional information relating to ownership and use of the site prior to 1932 if such
information is available through diligent inquiry of public records. P.L. 1997,
Ch.278, C13:1K-8. A preliminary assessment is the equivalent of a Phase I
ESA. See supra note 87.
101. New Jersey's Brownfields and Contamination Site Remediation Act de-
fines a "site investigation" to mean "the collection and evaluation of data ade-
quate to determine whether or not discharged hazardous substances or
hazardous wastes exist at the industrial establishment or have migrated or are
migrating from the site at levels in excess of the applicable remediation stan-
dards. A site investigation shall be developed based upon the information col-
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site investigation is necessary) .. ". . o2 Although a defined
standard is provided, potential purchasers have found New
Jersey courts to require not only performance of the activities
specified by the standard, but appropriate, pro-active follow-
up as well.
In Newhan Properties and Management v. Spill Compen-
sation Fund,103 Newhan Properties retained an inspection
firm to perform the equivalent of a preliminary assessment
on a four story retail building it intended to purchase. The
inspection firm reported the existence of an underground
storage tank (UST) that was "buried and not inspected" and
that additional information about the UST should be gath-
ered and a pressure test should be performed. 0 4 In addition,
the inspection firm reported that a leaking oil tank should be
thoroughly evaluated and that soil and materials in and
around the property had not been tested and there should be
additional independent evaluations for possible contamina-
tion, i.e., a Phase II ESA or a site investigation.10 5 An attor-
ney for Newhan Properties prepared the conditions for the
transaction that included the repair of the leaking oil tank,
the cleanup of soil adversely impacted by the leaking oil tank,
and a certification that repairs to the oil tank had been com-
pleted.10 6 In response, the seller represented in a letter that
all repairs had been completed. Representatives of Newhan
Properties re-visited the real property to confirm the seller's
representations.10 7 These representatives observed that the
subject area was "newly paved" with no oil stains and that an
above-ground oil tank was installed to replace the leaking oil
tank.108
lected pursuant to the preliminary assessment." P.L. 1997, Ch.278, C13:1K-8.
A site investigation is the equivalent of a Phase II ESA. See supra note 87.
102. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(g)(d)(2)(a)(d) (1998).
103. 97 N.J. Admin., 2d (EPE) 37, May 8, 1997, cert. denied, 152 N.J. 363
(1998).
104. See id. at 40.
105. See id. at 39-40; see supra note 87.
106. See id. at 40.
107. See id.
108. See id. 97 N.J. Admin., 2d (EPE) 37, 43, May 8, 1997, cert. denied, 152
N.J. 363 (1998).
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Four years later, Newhan Properties placed the subject
property for sale and a prospective purchaser, as a condition
of securing a mortgage, performed a preliminary assess-
ment.10 9 Suspicious of the observation of oil pumps, the pro-
spective purchaser performed a site investigation which
included the excavation of the area that had been "newly
paved" prior to Newhan Properties closing on the property. 110
The excavation revealed the presence of four USTs and con-
taminated soil."'
The Appellate Division of New Jersey's court system
ruled that Newman Properties failed to perform an adequate
site investigation and, hence, did not sufficiently perform an
"all appropriate inquiry." According to the Appellate Divi-
sion, "Newhan should have done more than merely accept a
representation by the seller that the necessary remediation
was complete." 11 2 The court stated that "based upon the ad-
vice received from its professionals, Newhan should have
taken reasonable steps to discover the extent of the problem.
Newhan failed to take such steps"" 3 and, thus, failed to meet
the lack of knowledge provision required to assert an inno-
cent landowner defense.
Case law has also broadened the "requisite knowledge of
hazardous substances" clause of CERCLA's innocent land-
owner defense to include knowledge of substances or waste
regardless of whether the purchaser knew the substances
were hazardous. In Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco
Ltd.," 4 Wickland purchased property which had stockpiles of
slag containing heavy metals deposited by Asarco, Ltd." 5
Although Wickland knew the slag contained lead, they were
not aware that the stockpiled material was characterized as
109. See id.
110. See id. at 44.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 52.
113. See 97 N.J. Admin., 2d (EPE) 37, 43, May 8, 1997, Cert. denied, 152 N.J.
363 (1998).
114. Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco Ltd., 590 F. Supp. 72 (N.C. Cal.
1984).
115. See id.
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hazardous waste. 116 The court found that Wickland, by vir-
tue of its awareness of the piles of slag on the site and its
knowledge that the slag contained lead, was not entitled to
the innocent landowner defense since it "knew or had reason
to know" of the hazardous substances on the site. 1 7 More
importantly, the court in Wickland refused to acknowledge
the defendant's claim that the Phase I ESA performed by
their consultants indicated that the slag piles did not present
a risk to the environment.118 Rather, the court examined the
content and magnitude of the publicly available information
about the site and concluded that a failure to review the state
agency's files on the property meant that Wickland did not
perform an adequate inquiry.1 19
At least one court appears to have gone a step further
than the Wickland holding with regard to a property owner's
reliance on their consultant's Phase I ESA. In BCW Associ-
ates, Ltd. v. Occidental Chemical Corp.,' 20 BCW Associates,
Ltd. (BCW) leased a warehouse to Knoll International (Knoll)
to store furniture.' 21 BCW had two independent ESAs per-
formed on the property before they purchased the property
from Occidental Chemical Company (Occidental).122 Simi-
larly, Knoll had an independent ESA performed on the prop-
erty before they entered into a lease agreement with BCW.' 23
Upon use of the storage space, Knoll hired a cleaning com-
pany to clean the furniture in storage.124 Without Knoll's
knowledge, the cleaning company had the dust that accumu-
lated on the furniture analyzed for the presence of chemical
116. See id. at 74.
117. See id. See also Jersey City Redevelopment. Auth. v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
866 F.2d 14011 (3d Cir. 1988) (where the court held that mere knowledge (or
reason to know) of the presence of waste, not whether the waste is hazardous,
will result in a loss of the affirmative defense).
118. See Wickland Oil Terminals, 590 F. Supp. at 74.
119. See Gershonowitz, supra note 34, at 626.
120. No. 86-5947, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11275, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29,
1988).
121. See id. at *4.
122. See id. at *8.
123. See id. at *8.
124. See id. at *9.
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contaminants. 125 The laboratory analysis revealed the pres-
ence of lead in the dust.126
BCW and Knoll sued Occidental and Firestone Tire Com-
pany (Firestone), Occidental's predecessor, for the recovery of
testing and cleanup costs in the warehouse as the lead dust
had originated from Firestone's operations.1 27 Although the
opinion did not indicate that the Phase I ESAs performed by
BCW and Knoll's consultants were an inadequate "all appro-
priate inquiry," the court held BCW and Knoll responsible for
two thirds of the response and clean-up costs. 28 The only
logical rationale appears to be that if the cleaning company
had the wherewithal to analyze the dust, BCW and Knoll
would have had reason to know of its hazardous quality
either through their dealings with Occidental or from the his-
tory of the property developed by their consultants. 129
D. Successful Assertion of the Innocent Landowner
Defense
The innocent landowner defense provision "has not func-
tioned effectively.' 30  There are limited published cases
where the court has upheld the assertion of the innocent
landowner defense,' 31 especially in the case where a pur-
chaser of property attempts to assert the affirmative de-
fense.1 32 Based on the foregoing discussion, it would appear
125. See BCW Assoc. Ltd. at *9.
126. See id. at *9.
127. See id. at *13.
128. See id. at *57-59.
129. See supra note 85, and accompanying text.
130. Proposals to Reauthorize the Superfund Program: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of
Carol Browner, U.S. EPA Administrator).
131. See United States v. Pacific Hide Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D.
Idaho 1989) (where the shareholders in a corporation were entitled to the inno-
cent landowner defense since they acquired stock in the corporation without
any knowledge of environmental problems); Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. National
Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992) (where the seller of property
was allowed to assert the innocent landowner defense because the purchaser's
activities, with regard to waste left in sealed containers by the seller's predeces-
sor, caused the release of hazardous substances).
132. See, e.g., Lashins Arcade Co., 856 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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that until CERCLA is amended to provide a definitive stan-
dard, a purchaser of property would need to convince the trier
of fact that the following evidentiary thresholds, where appli-
cable, have been exceeded:
1. The purchaser of the property did not have a contrac-
tual relationship with the seller.
2. Prior to the time of the acquisition, the purchaser per-
formed an "all appropriate inquiry" with regard to po-
tential environmental concerns at the subject
property and the "all appropriate inquiry" adhered to
the comprehensive standards (preliminary assess-
ment (Phase I ESA) and site investigation (Phase II
ESA)) enunciated by New Jersey law and ASTM
Standard E1527-94.
3. The "all appropriate inquiry" was performed by com-
petent personnel (i.e. experienced consultants) who
did not perform the investigation in a negligent
fashion.
4. The purchaser performed timely and appropriate fol-
low-up for all areas of environmental concern identi-
fied during the ESA, regardless of whether the
concern was identified in the consultant's summary,
recommendations and/or conclusion section of his re-
port or merely discussed throughout the report.
5. The purchaser evaluated all areas of potential envi-
ronmental concern identified, and based on the pro-
fessional judgement of the environmental consultant,
the level of knowledge appropriate for the purchaser
of the property, and prudent reasoning on the part of
the purchaser and his consultant, concluded that no
further investigation was warranted.
6. If the consultant merely recommends that further
data gathering and/or investigative activities should
be performed, the purchaser pro-actively performed
an independent, in-depth follow-up rather than relied
on corrective action representations made by the
seller and/or a cursory observation of the altered site
conditions.
7. The purchaser analyzed all potential areas of envi-
ronmental concern identified by the environmental
consultant, the level of knowledge appropriate for
25
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that of the purchaser of the property, and prudent
reasoning on the part of the potential purchaser and
his consultant, concluded that no consequences could
foreseeably result from the acts or omissions of a
third party.
8. Upon acquisition, the purchaser ensured that the op-
erations he acquired do not result in the "disposal" of
hazardous substances.
9. The property was acquired after the disposal of haz-
ardous substances.
10. Any contamination that existed at the time of the ac-
quisition did not migrate off-site.
While the statutory defense provision was a congressional ef-
fort to provide relief for a defined group of "innocent" land-
owner purchasers, the result is a provision which provides
none of the direct relief sought and instead expands the re-
sponsibilities and obligations of prospective purchasers of
real property.133
V. A Comparative Analysis: The Affirmative Defense
of an Innocent Landowner Verses the Prima
Facie Case of a Toxic Tort Plaintiff
The basis of this Article is that a purchaser of commer-
cial or industrial property may be subject to at least two types
of legal claims if the subject property is purchased without
the performance of adequate environmental due diligence.
The potential liability of a purchaser of real property can be
in the form of a neighborhood citizen who files a toxic tort
based complaint in state court and, secondly, in the form of a
government agency who brings a CERCLA based complaint
in federal court.'34 Assume arguendo that a property owner
successfully asserts the innocent landowner defense relieving
him of statutory liability for environmental harm in the fed-
133. See Strock, supra note 80, at 592. These increased responsibilities and
obligations will not be diminished in the Brownfields and Environmental
Cleanup Act of 1999 (Senate Bill S. 20), or a similar Bill, since the proposed
standard, to prove compliance with the "all appropriate inquiry," requires a sig-
nificant undertaking by prospective purchasers. Id.
134. See supra part I.
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/1
1999] DEFENSE OF AN INNOCENT LANDOWNER 269
eral, CERCLA based complaint. Having proved his innocence
by a preponderance of the evidence that the environmental
harm was caused solely by a third party and that due care
was exercised on his part, the "innocent landowner" should
move for summary judgment 135 in the toxic tort based claim
filed in state court. The issue to be answered by the analysis
contained herein is whether the court would grant the motion
after oral arguments.
This section demonstrates that a plaintiff would not be
able to establish a prima facie case for the various toxic tort
theories if the property owner is an innocent landowner pur-
suant to CERCLA. The prima facie elements for each toxic
tort theory are analyzed in the context of the previously dis-
cussed case law which establishes an evidentiary threshold
for prospective purchasers/property owners wishing to avail
themselves of the innocent landowner defense. Since causa-
tion is a necessary prerequisite under each of the tort theo-
ries, the causation element is discussed apart from the
analysis performed on each tort theory.
A. The Theory of Trespass
To establish a prima facie case for trespass, the plaintiff-
neighbor must prove that there was a physical invasion of the
plaintiffs real property, that the property owner intended to
bring about the invasion, and the physical invasion of the
real property was legally caused by the property owner's
act.136 The applicable part of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts to the instant case states that one is subject to liability
to another for trespass if he intentionally causes a hazardous
substance to enter land in possession of another.1 37 The "in-
tent" of the property owner denotes that he knew the conse-
135. Summary judgment may be granted as long as no genuine issue of ma-
terial fact exists and the movant must be entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Chipollimi v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F. 2d 893, 896 (3d Cir.), cert dis-
missed, 483 U.S. 1052, 108 S.Ct. 26, 97 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987). "The moving party
bears the initial burden of identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323,
106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed. 265 (1986).
136. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
137. See id.
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quences of his act, or that he believed that the consequences
are substantially certain to result from it.138
In a toxic tort action, the "act" of the property owner
would equate to the release or threatened release of hazard-
ous substances to the environment. The innocent landowner
defense requires that the property owner acquire the prop-
erty after the release or threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances. Case law has shown that a property owner can lose
innocent landowner affirmative defenses if the operations he
acquires do not adhere to good manufacturing practices or
passive migration takes place subsequent to acquiring the
property.
The potential purchaser of the property, via his "all ap-
propriate inquiry," would know the likelihood of a release or
potential release from the existing operations and should
know whether the property is contaminated. During the per-
formance of a due diligence investigation, the identification of
environmental liabilities will be from four sources: (i) lack of
good manufacturing practices from an existing operation that
is creating a threat of a release of hazardous substances to
the environment; (ii) existing contamination that is present
as a result of historical operations and activities; (iii) contam-
ination on, in, or underlying neighboring properties that has
the potential of adversely impacting the property under con-
sideration via migration; and/or (iv) operations and activities
being conducted on surrounding properties that have the po-
tential to adversely impact the subject property in the future
(e.g., neighboring underground storage tanks).
The sole purpose for a potential purchaser of property to
commission an environmental due diligence is to identify po-
tential and existing environmental liabilities, both on-site
and off-site. It would be unrealistic for a plaintiff-neighbor to
allege the potential purchaser intended to cause hazardous
substances to migrate from the subject property, since the po-
tential purchaser himself seeks to avoid the consequences of
138. See id. § 8A.
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the historical acts 139 of the previous property owners as re-
lated to the release of hazardous substances to the environ-
ment. This avoidance includes refusing to purchase
contaminated property which has the potential to adversely
impact neighboring properties. 140
Similarly, if the plaintiff was determined by the courts
to be an innocent landowner, he or she would not meet the
burden of persuasion regarding "knowing" with certainty, or
substantial certainty' 41 that the plaintiffs property would
be invaded by contamination emanating from the prop-
erty under consideration. In Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v.
ASARCO, 142 the court would not allow a third party defend-
ant to assert the innocent landowner defense even though the
laboratory analyses performed on the limited amount of ma-
terial sent to the landfill contained "extremely small concen-
trations of hazardous [substances]."143 The court held that
"even a minimal" threat of a release is sufficient to defeat an
innocent landowner defense claim. In United States v. A & N
Cleaners & Launderers, Inc.,144 the court stated that once an
environmental concern is identified, due care requires one to
undertake the necessary activities to ascertain the nature of
any "environmental threats" associated with the release.145
Lastly, such an assertion by the plaintiff-neighbor is at
direct odds with the lack of knowledge provision in the inno-
cent landowner defense. Hence, given the high bar courts
139. See id. Cmt. a."Intent," as it is used in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, refers to the consequences of an act rather than the act itself. See id.
140. This is not to imply that contaminated property is not transferable in
the real estate market. Commercial and industrial properties that have had
hazardous substances stored and used at the property prior to the promulgation
of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 6901) and its
state counterparts are likely to have some degree of contamination. Such trans-
actions are caveated with indemnification clauses and a delineation of which
party is responsible for the clean-up of existing contamination.
141. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. b.
142. 735 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
143. Id. at 160.
144. 854 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
145. See id. at 243-44.
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have established for this provision, 146 if the courts acknowl-
edge that the potential purchaser is an innocent landowner,
the potential purchaser would not have known with substan-
tial certainty that the plaintiffs property would become con-
taminated. As a result, the plaintiff-neighbor would not be
able to make a prima facie case for trespass since he would
not be able to prove the common law intent element.
B. The Theory of Strict Liability
In enacting CERCLA, "Congress intended that responsi-
ble parties be held strictly liable, even though an explicit pro-
vision for strict liability was not included in the [legislative]
compromise .... ,,147 CERCLA "unequivocally imposes strict
liability on the current owner of a facility from which there is
a release or threat of release, without regard to causation."148
"The overwhelming body of precedent . ..has interpreted
[CERCLA] as establishing a strict liability scheme" subject
only to the statutory defenses for damages caused solely by
acts of God, war, or third parties. 149
Under the common law tort theory, some courts have
proclaimed that the use, storage and/or disposal of hazardous
substances is an abnormally dangerous activity and the
keeper of such substances should be held strictly liable. 150
Most courts, however, have consistently determined that haz-
146. See Wickland Oil Terminals, 590 F. Supp. at 74; Newhan Properties
and Management v. Spill Compensation Fund, 97 N.J. Admin., 2d (EPE) 37,
May 8, 1997 cert. denied, 152 N.J.363 (1998).
147. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042.
148. Id. at 1044.
149. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
150. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293, 1307-
08 (5th Cir. 1982); State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d
150, 157 (N.J. 1983). The general principle of an abnormally dangerous activity
states that: (1) one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject
to liability for harm to person, land or chattels of another resulting from the
activity, although he exercised the utmost care to prevent, and (2) this strict
liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activ-
ity abnormally dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976). In
deciding whether to hold that the use, storage and/or disposal of hazardous sub-
stances is an abnormally dangerous activity, the Ashland and Ventron courts
considered the factors enumerated in § 520 of the Restatement.
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ardous waste generation or disposal is either not an abnor-
mally dangerous activity, or does not involve the requisite
intent to invoke the application of strict liability. 151 Without
a statutory strict liability scheme for personal injuries caused
by hazardous substances, these courts have refused to apply
strict liability. 152
Assuming the more restrictive approach holds for com-
mon law strict liability as applied to hazardous substances, it
would seem absurd for a property owner-defendant to be re-
lieved of tort liability simply because he was successful in as-
serting an affirmative defense granted by a statute to which
Congress explicitly would not permit redress for a neighbor
subject to hazardous substance-induced injury to his person
or property. This theory, however, does not seem so prepos-
terous when one examines CERCLA's strict liability in rela-
tion to the common law.
The application of strict liability is broader under CER-
CLA than it is under the common law.- 53 In State, Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp., 54 the
leading case espousing the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§§ 519-20, the court's holding makes clear that liability at-
taches when a release of hazardous substances to the envi-
ronment occurs.' 55 Conversely, CERCLA liability can arise
whenever "there is a release, or threatened release which
151. See Rory A. Valas, Toxic Palsgraf: Proving Causation When the Link
Between Conduct and Injury Appears Highly Extraordinary, 18 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 773, 778 (1990-1991) (citing Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F.
Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986), affd sub nom.; Anderson v. Cryovac, 862 F.2d 910
(1st Cir. 1988); Ewell v. Petro Processors, Inc., 364 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App.
1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 575 (La. 1979)).
152. See id. at 779 (citing, Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219
(D. Mass. 1986); Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., 364 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App.
1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 575 (La. 1979); Bagley v. Controlled Env't Corp.,
503 A.2d 823 ( N.H.1986)).
153. See Michael J. Gergen, The Failed Promise of the Polluter Pays Princi-
ple: An Economic Analysis of Landowner Liability for Hazardous Waste, 69
N.Y.U.L. REV. 624, 644 (1994).
154. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).
155. See id. While activities associated with the disposal of hazardous waste
[substances] may benefit society, "the law of liability has evolved so that a prop-
erty owner is strictly liable to others for harm caused by toxic wastes that are
stored on his property and flow onto the property of others." Id. at 157.
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causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous sub-
stances."156 In Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, Inc.,157 the district court holding was reversed for fail-
ing to consider "whether defendant's releases (or threatened
releases) might nevertheless have caused the plaintiff to in-
cur 'response costs' even though those releases did not in fact
contaminate the wells." 158  Thus, CERCLA liability is
broader than that found under common law because an ac-
tual release is not required to create CERCLA liability.159
Moreover, under the common law concerning abnormally
dangerous activities, which the Ventron court has held to in-
clude past and present disposal of hazardous substances, the
property owner would be found liable only if he intentionally
brought the hazard onto his property. 160 CERCLA liability,
on the other hand, attaches to the property owner regardless
of the lack of an affirmative act on the part of the property
owner.161
Conceding the absence of a vehicle for the recovery of
compensatory damages, CERCLA casts a wider net than the
common law does to capture those responsible for environ-
mental harm. 162 The effect is that those truly responsible for
causing harm to the property or person of neighbors are a
subset of those subject to strict liability under CERCLA. If a
property owner can prove his innocence under the broad
strict liability scheme of CERCLA, he should surely be al-
lowed to impart this innocence in a toxic tort action employ-
ing the theory of strict liability. This approach is consistent
with a corrective justice model advocating the system of tort
law to "respond to ordinary views on individual blame and
accountability" and that a defendant should not be held re-
156. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
157. 889 F.2d 1146 (1 t Cir. 1989).
158. Id. at 1157.
159. See Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 167.
160. See Ventron, 468 A.2d at 150.
161. See Gergen, supra note 145, at 651.
162. See id.
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sponsible unless it can be shown that he created a dangerous
condition which "resulted in" harm to another. 163
C. The Theory of Nuisance
Nuisance does not signify any particular kind of conduct
on the part of the defendant. 164 Rather, a private nuisance
can be described as a "nontrespassory invasion of another's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." 165 In the
context of this Article's analysis, the property owner would be
subject to liability for a private nuisance "if, but only if, his
conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in
the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is...
unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules con-
trolling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for ab-
normally dangerous conditions or activities."' 66 Thus, the
analysis of whether a property owner could successfully as-
sert his court acknowledged status as an innocent landowner
to defend a nuisance claim arising from the same cause of
action, is a hybrid of this Article's strict liability and causa-
tion analyses. 167
An element of the Restatement's general principle, which
is not previously discussed, is the role of negligent or reckless
conduct in the theory of nuisance. As in all negligence or
recklessness cases, an unreasonable risk of harm must be
created by the defendant.' 68 In order to establish a prima fa-
cie case for negligence, the plaintiff-neighbor would need to
prove that the property owner breached his duty to conform
to a specific standard of conduct for the protection of the
163. BOSTON & MADDEN, supra note 22, at 104 (citing Richard Epstein, A
Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973)).
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A cmt. b. "The word has ref-
erence to two particular kinds of harm - the invasion of two kinds of interests"
public nuisance and private nuisance. For the purposes of this Article, only pri-
vate nuisance will be examined.
165. Id. § 821.
166. Id. § 822.
167. See discussions supra Parts V.B. and infra Part V.D. respectively.
168. See BOSTON & MADDEN, supra note 22, at 77.
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plaintiff against an unreasonable risk of injury.169 What,
then, is the property owner's duty during the performance of
a pre-purchase environmental due diligence so that the po-
tential purchaser does not cause unreasonable risk of injury
to the plaintiff?170
The plaintiff would not be able to claim the existence of
negligence per se.171 First, the negligence per se doctrine has
recognized that courts should only adopt those standards of
conduct that are explicit in statutes intended to protect a par-
ticular class of individuals and not the interests of the state
or the public at large.172 The purpose of CERCLA is to expe-
dite the clean-up of hazardous waste sites in order to protect
the general public. 173 Secondly, the standard of conduct must
be clearly defined in the statute or regulation in order to ap-
ply the negligence per se doctrine.174 In a memo dated April
14, 1994, from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Re-
sponse to EPA's regional offices, the EPA wrote that it would
not clarify the meaning of "all appropriate inquiry" in Section
101(35) of CERCLA.175
Without the availability of a statutorily defined standard
of conduct, the general duty to act as an ordinary, prudent,
reasonable person is applicable. 176 Statutory defenses in-
cluding due diligence, reliance on expert opinion, and lack of
169. See discussion infra Part V.D. The plaintiff would also need to prove
damage to the plaintiffs person or property and actual and proximate cause.
170. See discussion supra Part IV. It is assumed that if the owner acted in a
negligent or reckless fashion with regard to the use, storage and/or disposal of
hazardous substances/wastes subsequent to his acquisition of the property, he
would not qualify for the innocent landowner defense.
171. See W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 36, at 227-31 (5' ed. 1984).
172. See Sheila Bush, Can You Get There From Here? Noncompliance with
Environmental Regulations as Negligence Per Se in Tort Cases, 25 IDAHO L.
REV. 469, 473 (1988-89).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1)-(38).
174. See Bush, supra note 164, at 474.
175. See Standard for Innocent Landowner Defense Will Not Be Clarified,
EPA Says in Memo, 8 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 1340 (Apr. 27, 1994). But see pro-
posed Senate Bill S. 20, Brownfields and Environmental Cleanup Act of 1999,
supra note 85; supra note 82 and accompanying text discussing the statutorily
defined meaning for an "all appropriate inquiry" under New Jersey law.
176. See W. PAGE KEETON, supra note 162 § 32, at 173.
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causation are classic reasonable person defenses in the vein
of common law negligence. 177 The provisions of CERCLA's
innocent landowner defense incorporates each of these
concepts. 173
Moreover, in the absence of a statutorily defined stan-
dard, case law has defined due care on the part of a pur-
chaser/property owner to include an investigation of the
subject property, (i.e., a Phase I ESA) an area of environmen-
tal concern is identified the purchase/property owner must
then take the necessary steps to ascertain the nature of envi-
ronmental concern and associated impact to the environment
(i.e., Phase II/Phase III ESA).179 Thus, the court-defined
duty of care is nothing more than a rewording of the "all ap-
propriate inquiry" language that is contained in the statutory
innocent landowner defense. I8 0 It follows that CERCLA's
statutory provision imposes an obligation on the purchaser/
property owner that is equivalent to the duty of care to deter-
mine whether the parties were negligent in the context of a
common law nuisance cause of action.
CERCLA liability exceeds common law nuisance liability
because the latter requires "some causal connection ... be-
tween the nuisance and the landowner beyond mere owner-
ship of the property on which the nuisance originates."' 8 '
Hypothetically, if an "innocent landowner" obtains title of a
vacant parcel of land for investment purposes which, unbe-
knownst to him, emanates contaminated groundwater as a
result of prior midnight dumping, the "innocent landowner"
177. See Jack E. Karns, Edwin A. Doty & Steven S. Long, Accountant and
Attorney Liability as "Sellers" of Securities Under Section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933: Judicial Rejection of the Statutory, Collateral Participant Status
Cause of Action, 74 NEB. L. REV. 1, 34 (1995) (discussing the Securities Act of
1933 which regulates the initial disclosure of information regarding the sale
and transfer of securities).
178. See supra Part III.
179. See supra notes 87, 92, 93 and accompanying text.
180. This is supported by the meaning of "all appropriate inquiry" as defined
by the New Jersey legislatures which is consistent with the duty of care im-
posed upon a prospective purchaser/property owner by the courts. See supra
note 85.
181. John J. Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Liability
be Abolished? 6 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 271, 297 (1986-87).
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will be subject to CERCLA liability solely due to his owner-
ship of the vacant parcel of land from which the nuisance
originates. Conversely, the "innocent landowner" would not
be liable in a private nuisance action as his conduct, mere
ownership, was not the legal cause of invasion upon the
neighboring property.'8 2 Hence, the liability provisions of
CERCLA "exploits the model of nuisance law by strengthen-
ing the legal hand of the owner whose property is polluted
. 8.. ,,183 This broader liability scheme, along with the forego-
ing analysis and read in conjunction with Part V.B. and Part
V.D. of this Article, illustrates the fact that if a property
owner is deemed to be an innocent landowner by the courts,
neighboring property owners or residents would not be able
to establish a prima facie case for negligence against the in-
nocent landowner.
D. The Principles of Causation
While causation is fundamental in tort law for the appor-
tionment of liability, it is one of the most difficult burdens for
a plaintiff to overcome in establishing a prima facie case in a
toxic tort matter. The numerous types of hazardous sub-
stances that may be present at a site, the varied sources and
generators from which a single hazardous substance could
derive, and the lack of documentation and potentially inform-
ative persons, due to the latency period between the release
and injury date, are factors which create difficulties in prov-
ing causation. Had Congress adopted the House of Represen-
tative's approach to causation, which recommended the
imposition of liability on those who caused or contributed to
the hazardous waste problems, CERCLA plaintiffs would
have faced similar burden of proof obstacles. 8 4
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822. One is subject to liability
for private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of invasion of
another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is
either: (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise ac-
tionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct,
or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities. Id.
183. William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environ-
mental Law: Origins and Morphology, 27 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1009, 1021 (1994).
184. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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By enacting the Senate's version which is based on the
responsible party theory, CERCLA does not contain any spe-
cific causation provision in the statutory language.18 5 Hence,
the courts have not required those plaintiffs suffering from
hazardous substance injuries to prove causation under CER-
CLA because of the well-noted difficulties in determining the
cause of injuries.18 6 Rather, Congress' inclusion of the three
statutory, causation-based, affirmative defenses 8 7 shifts the
causation burden of proof to the defendant property owner. 188
It has been shown that relatively insignificant involvement
by the property owner will defeat the causation-based inno-
cent landowner affirmative defense.' 8 9
Should CERCLA not fully resolve the issues of liability,
legislative history suggests that the traditional and evolving
principles of common law should govern.1 90 Under tradi-
tional tort causation principles, liability will lie where the de-
fendant's actions were both the cause-in-fact and the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.' 91 The cause-in-fact
element requires that the plaintiff-neighbor show that the
property owner's actions constituted a "substantial factor in
bringing about the harm." 92 The Restatement suggests
three considerations in determining whether the property
owner's actions amounted to a "substantial factor":
(1) the extent to which the property owner's actions con-
tributed to the harm;
185. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
186. See Nagle, supra note 19, at 1495 (arguments by property owners, that
CERCLA requires proof of causation by the plaintiff, have not been successful).
See, e.g., Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1044-45; United States v. Cauffman,
15 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,161 (C.D. Cal. 1984). See id. at 1506.
187. See supra note 33.
188. See Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1293 (D.R.I. 1986), aft'd, 883
F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
189. See id. at 1293.
190. See statement of Senator Randolph. S. REP. No. 96-848 at 13 (1980),
reprinted in 1 U.S. Senate Comm. on Env't & Public Works, A Legislative His-
tory of the Comprehensive Envt'l Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (Superfund), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1983).
191. See W. PAGE KEETON, supra note 163, at 173-75.
192. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 431(a).
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(2) whether the property owner's actions created a force
that operated up to the time of the harm; and
(3) the amount of time that elapsed between the property
owner's actions and the harm. 193
The cases examined in Part IV (B) of this Article suggest
that: (i) the failure to act,194 (ii) the failure to act appropri-
ately;195 (iii) the failure to act promptly; 96 as well as (iv) con-
tributing to a release that may not even migrate and cause
harm to a neighboring property in an insignificant manner 97
will result in a loss of the innocent landowner defense. 98
Thus, the notion of imputing CERCLA's innocent landowner
defense to common law tort theories survives the cause-in-
fact requirement since actions that amount to something less
than being a "substantial factor" will defeat the CERCLA
defense.
Proximate cause requires that the plaintiff-neighbor's
personal injury and/or property damage was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the property owner's actions. Pas-
sive migration, 99 a consequence that would appear not to be
reasonably foreseeable as well as the future acts of ten-
ants,200 which are hardly foreseeable, have denied CERCLA's
innocent landowner defense to property owners.
In sum, the property owner has the burden of proving
that the release, or threat of release, was caused solely by
others.201 While the courts have strictly construed this re-
quirement, if successful, the property-owner has overcome
the threshold that he did not cause the release of hazardous
substance and hence did not cause the environmental harm
193. Id.
194. See A & N Cleaners & Launderers Inc., 854 F. Supp. at 243-44.
195. See Newhan Properties and Management v. Spill Compensation Fund,
97 N.J.A.R. 2d (EPE) 37, A-2915-95T1, May 8, 1997, cert. denied, 152 N.J. 363
(1998); Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
196. See Shapiro, 741 F. Supp. at 478.
197. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 735 F. Supp. at 358.
198. See id.
199. See Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d 837, 845.
200. See Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529; See also A & N Cleaners & Launder-
ers, Inc., 854 F. Supp. at 243-44.
201. See Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. at 1293.
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to the subject property and/or neighboring properties. If the
court relieves the property owner from CERCLA liability for
not causing the release of hazardous substances, the plaintiff-
neighbor will not be able to overcome the burden of proof that
the property-owner caused injury to his person or property
under the common toxic tort theories. Simply put, the prop-
erty owner did not cause the harm to the environment and,
hence, there would be no material issue of fact that would
preclude a motion for summary judgment in a subsequent
toxic tort action.
VI. Conclusion
Although CERCLA was founded on the principles of com-
mon law, the courts have made it clear that "[in passing this
legislation,... Congress did not intend to make injured par-
ties whole or to create a general vehicle for toxic tort ac-
tions."20 2 Congress did, however, create the ATSDR which
gives toxic tort plaintiffs access to toxicological profiles devel-
oped under the jurisdiction of CERCLA.203 Moreover, CER-
CLA requires that the Administrator of the ATSDR perform a
health assessment 20 4 for each "Superfund site," and gives dis-
cretionary authority to the Administrator to perform health
assessments where individuals have been exposed to hazard-
202. Versatile Metals, Inc. v. The Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1582-83
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (citing Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle Cty., 659 F.
Supp. 1269, 1299 (D. Del. 1987)); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 375
(1986)).
203. See supra note 31.
204. See 42 U.S.C § 9604(i)(6)(F). The term "health assessment" means the
preliminary assessments of the potential risk to human health posed by indi-
vidual properties, based on such factors as the nature and extent of contamina-
tion, the existence of potential pathways of human exposure (including ground
or surface water contamination, air emissions, and food chain contamination,
the potential susceptibility of the community within the likely pathways of ex-
posure, the comparison of expected human exposure levels to the short-term
and long-term healthy effects associated with identified hazardous substances
and any available recommended exposure or tolerance limits for such hazard-
ous substances, and the comparison of existing morbidity and mortality data on
diseases that may be associated with the observed levels of exposure. See id.
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ous substances for which the probable source of such expo-
sure is a release from any site.205
Thus, while CERCLA is not a toxic tort statute, its provi-
sions create a powerful device to assist the toxic tort plain-
tiff.20 6 The owners of the property from which the hazardous
substances might emanate were not afforded a reciprocating
statutory defense by Congress in order to defend themselves
in litigation against a plaintiff-neighbor whose case is forti-
fied by CERCLA's provisions.20 7 What little Congress did
provide to property owners, in defense of claims brought con-
sistent with the purpose of CERCLA, has been rendered prac-
tically meaningless by the courts who have strictly construed
CERCLA's three statutory defenses. 208
An examination of relevant case law has demonstrated
that the probability of successfully asserting the innocent
landowner defense is extremely low. 20 9 If successful, how-
ever, a comparative analysis illustrates that compliance with
the innocent landowner defense provisions, as construed by
the courts, would prevent a plaintiff-neighbor from establish-
ing a prima facie case for the various toxic tort theories.
Given the intimate toxic tort relationship, the benefits that
toxic tort plaintiffs receive from the ATSDR, and the exceed-
ingly lofty evidentiary thresholds the courts have established
for a prospective purchaser/property owner to overcome in or-
der to assert his status of an innocent landowner, it would
seem equitable to allow CERCLA's innocent landowner provi-
sion to be used as a defense in a toxic tort suit that arises
from the same cause of action.
One can only theorize why such an application of the in-
nocent landowner defense has not been used, and what the
reality of this strategy is for the future. First, the innocent
landowner defense has only existed since 1986. As a result of
the wide discretion given to the courts in interpreting the
provisions of this affirmative defense, the subsequent strict
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(A), (B).
206. See Versatile Metals Inc., 693 F. Supp. at 1582.
207. See supra note 33.
208. See id.
209. See id.
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interpretation of these provisions by the courts, an adequate,
evidentiary threshold for the various provisions of the inno-
cent landowner defense only now exists for prospective pur-
chasers. Second, potential purchasers of commercial and
industrial real estate must use this evidentiary threshold in
the future to design their pre-purchase environmental due
diligence. The potential purchasers must realize the proverb
"penny wise - dollar foolish" has direct applicability in the
environmental and toxic tort liability context. The design of a
comprehensive environmental due diligence today will allow
a purchaser of property to be an innocent landowner to-
morrow. Third, potential purchasers must recognize that cer-
tain business objectives (e.g., closing the transaction by a
certain date) must be evaluated in conjunction with an un-
derstanding of the potential environmental liabilities that
may result by failing to act appropriately and thoroughly af-
ter the preliminary environmental assessment (i.e., not act-
ing on their consultants' or attorneys' recommendations for
subsequent data gathering and investigation). Lastly, timing
is everything. An attempt to apply the innocent landowner
defense to a toxic tort claim can only materialize when the
truly innocent landowner becomes subject to the two legal at-
tacks for environmental liabilities arising from ownership of
real property.
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